Last week, the final warship—a Project 1135 class patrol frigate—quietly departed Sevastopol harbor, which had been the main base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet since 2014. Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk suggested that this day should be remembered.
While I’ve previously advised caution in drawing too much optimism from maritime victories in this conflict, it’s worth considering what this significant withdrawal means more broadly.
Operationally, losing the port is a major blow, though it has been anticipated for some time. The question now is whether the scale of this setback will have a strategic impact.
From a maritime standpoint, this represents the latest in a series of humiliations for the Black Sea Fleet since the invasion began in 2022. The fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, sank in April 2022, revealing a severe deficiency in Russian warship defenses.
In October of the same year, unmanned drones attacked Sevastopol, damaging the corvette Admiral Makarov.
By September 2023, a Storm Shadow missile strike severely damaged the warship Minsk and the submarine Rostov on Don, and hit the Sevastopol naval headquarters. These strikes were made possible by special forces and targeted missile attacks on Russian S-400 air defense systems. The Russian naval leadership then retreated to a backup command post at Verkhne Sadovoe, only for it to be hit shortly after.
Simultaneously, Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) targeted the tanker Yaz and the arms ship Ursa Major. In October, UK Armed Forces Minister James Heappey labeled the Black Sea Fleet as ‘functionally defeated,’ though I believed this was premature.
At that time, Russian attempts to restrict grain exports through the Bosphorus were still effective, and Russia retained some missile-armed ships and submarines. However, the inability to track and target vessels in the western Black Sea indicated a weakened position.
By December, ongoing attacks and the lack of effective surveillance meant that the waters between Odesa and Snake Island were safer for grain vessels and merchant traffic. By March, surface strikes with the Magura V5 USV had sunk a third of the Black Sea Fleet, leading the UK Ministry of Defence to describe the fleet as “functionally inactive.”
In May, a multi-pronged attack hit the port of Novorossiysk, the Tuapse refinery, and a nearby oil terminal, while American-supplied ATACMS missiles struck Sevastopol, sinking the minesweeper Kurovets and hitting a Karakurt class Kalibr corvette.
Attempts on the Kerch road and rail bridges, though damaging, have not been decisive. The significance of these bridges, both tactically and symbolically, makes them a likely future target for ATACMS.
Recent events include a large attack on Sevastopol’s support facilities, with Russia claiming to have destroyed numerous UAVs and USVs. The accuracy of this claim remains uncertain.
Looking ahead, there are three key considerations:
- Maritime Attrition Impact: Russia’s maritime capabilities to fight at sea, enforce blockades, and manage sea-based logistics are nearing zero, even with some Kalibr missiles remaining. Russia’s ability to move supplies by sea is severely hampered, particularly at the western front, where supplies must now travel through vulnerable routes.
- Status of Crimea: The peninsula, which Putin has described as Russia’s ‘holy land,’ is no longer a viable base for maritime operations. The Kerch bridges are within range of various weapon systems, and Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to combine these effectively. The potential isolation of Crimea could have significant strategic and political consequences for Putin.
- Escalation Management: The fear of crossing red lines has influenced the responses of NATO and its allies. The fall of Sevastopol might prompt a reassessment of these limits and potentially lead to more decisive support for Ukraine. The West’s past reluctance to confront Russian and Chinese activities in the grey zone also highlights the broader issue of how red lines are managed.
In summary, while the operational impact of losing Sevastopol is notable, the strategic effects on escalation management, NATO support levels, and Ukrainian morale could be even more significant.
